Although the application of artificial intelligence (AI) in chemistry is advancing rapidly, its practical implementation and governance in the context of chemical weapons control remain at an early stage. Rather than consolidating existing tools, many AI papers introduce new models, creating a fragmented and largely unregulated landscape. This poses risks for chemical weapons control, as it could facilitate the discovery of novel synthesis routes for chemical warfare agents, for example. At the same time, promising AI applications for verification, forensics, training, and mission planning remain unimplemented, creating an “execution gap” between recognized opportunities and operational practice. While the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) remains a robust instrument and AI does not currently pose an immediate existential threat, preserving this situation will require systematic monitoring of AI developments, capacity building, engagement with developers on dual-use safeguards, and efforts to overcome the political obstacles that hamper effective implementation and regulation.
Bibliographische Angaben
Gasse, P. (2026). Artificial Intelligence in Chemistry and Chemical Weapons Control: Fragmentation and the “Execution Gap”. In: Göttsche, M., Jakob, U., & Schörnig, N. (Eds.). Verification in an Era of Rapid Technological Change. CNTR Monitor – Technology and Arms Control 2026. PRIF – Peace Research Institute Frankfurt.
Autor
Dr. Philip Gasse
